display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Everything worth notice is worth recording; and those records should be so made that they can readily be arranged, and particularly so that they can be rearranged. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: Yet another epigraph for my project! Peirce must have had a study piled with labelled notes, and he would have adored this database, at least in its theory. |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences. |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as an absolutely detached idea. It would be no idea at all. For an idea is itself a continuous system. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: This is the new anti-epigraph for this database. This idea is part of Peirce's idea that relations are the central feature of our grasp of the world. |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like. |