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3 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
Full Idea: For us there are four cardinal moral virtues: courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. But Aristotle and Aquinas call only three of these virtues moral virtues; practical wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) they class with the intellectual virtues. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'for us'. How many of us rank temperance as a supreme virtue? Aristotle ranks phronesis (which I think of as 'common sense') as the key enabler of the moral virtues, making it unlike the other intellectual virtues. |
5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Any good philosophy will need to offer wisdom about who we are as well as about how we ought to be. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 14) | |
A reaction: This sop should be accepted gratefully by fans of bioethics, who seem inclined to think that describing 'how we are' is all that needs to be said. Maybe the key wisdom lies in the relationship between the 'is' and the 'ought' of human nature. |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
Full Idea: Knowledge that can be acquired only by someone who is clever or who has access to special training is not counted as part of wisdom. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.6) | |
A reaction: Consider Pierre's peasant friend Platon Karatayev in 'War and Peace'. I assume 'special training' rules out anyone with a philosophy degree. |