Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Letter to Mersenne' and 'Human, All Too Human'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Truth tends to reveal its highest wisdom in the guise of simplicity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 609)
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Whoever thinks more deeply knows that he is always wrong, whatever his acts and judgments.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 518)
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The transition from momentary fear to short-lived exuberance is called the 'comic'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 169)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The acknowledgement that the sphere of knowledge is wider than the sphere of 'science' seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro)
     A reaction: A very nice remark, with which I intuitively agree, but then you are left with the problem of explaining how something can qualify as knowledge when it can't pass the stringent tests of science. How wide to we spread, and why?
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Some non-scientific knowledge is presupposed by science; for example, I have been arguing that 'refers' and 'true' cannot be made scientifically precise; yet truth is a fundamental term in logic - a precise science.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI)
     A reaction: We might ask whether we 'know' what 'true' and 'refers' mean, as opposed to being able to use them. If their usage doesn't count as knowledge, then we could still end up with all actual knowledge being somehow 'scientific'.