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Ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things' and 'The Ages of the World'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The metaphysician who is not prepared to grapple with the difficulties of modern exact logic had better put up his shutters and go out of the trade.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: This announcement comes before Russell proclaimed mathematical logic to be the heart of metaphysics (though it is contemporary with Frege's work, of which Peirce was unaware). It places Peirce firmly in the analytic tradition.
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is (such as properties, meanings and numbers). I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], Intro)
     A reaction: I find that an enormously helpful distinction, and support the Aristotelian view. Schaffer's general line is that what exists is fairly uncontroversial and dull, but the interesting truths about the world emerge when we grasp its structure.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Traditional metaphysics is so tightly woven into the fabric of philosophy that it cannot be torn out without the whole tapestry unravelling.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3)
     A reaction: I often wonder why the opponents of metaphysics still continue to do philosophy. I don't see how you address questions of ethics, or philosophy of mathematics (etc) without coming up against highly general and abstract over-questions.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the science of being, not merely as given in physical experience, but of being in general, its laws and types.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: I agree with this. The question then is whether such a science is possible. Dogmatic empiricists think not. Explanatory empiricists (me) think it is.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical reasonings, such as they have hitherto been, have been simple enough for the most part. It is the metaphysical concepts which it is difficult to apprehend.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: Peirce is not, of course, saying that it is just conceptual, because for him science comes first. It is the woolly concepts that alienate some people from metaphysics. Metaphysicians should challenge the concepts they use much, much more!