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2 ideas
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
Full Idea: The motto of what is presented here is 'less conceptual analysis, more metaphysics', where the distinction is equivalent to the distinction between saying what 'F' means and saying what being F is. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to capture exactly the spirit of metaphysics since Saul Kripke's work, though some people engaged in it seem to me to be trapped in an outdated linguistic view of the matter. Molnar credits Locke as the source of his view. |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
Full Idea: An analysis of a concept tells us what the concept is by telling us what its constituents are and how they are combined. ..The features of the concept are present in the analysis, making it surprising the 'reductive' analyses are sought. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: He says that there are nevertheless reductive analyses, such as David Lewis's analysis of modality. We must disentangle conceptual analysis from causal analysis (e.g. in his example of the physicalist reduction of mind). |