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3 ideas
6855 | Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M] |
Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments. | |
From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134) | |
A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world. |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |