display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Abstract identity (which is what here is also called 'concept') and being are the two moments that reason seeks to unify; this unification is the Ideal of reason. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §49) | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I connect it to Aristotle's approach to the problem of being, which was to abandon the head-on approach, and aim to understand the identities of particulars and kinds. |
| 15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: The older metaphysics has the naïve presupposition that thinking grasps what things are in-themselves, that things only are what they genuinely are when they are captured in thought. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §28 Add) | |
| A reaction: His 'older' metaphysics is prior to Kant's critique. The less naïve version is more aware of antinomies and dialectical conflicts within thought. |
| 21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §24), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 02 'Logic' | |
| A reaction: Not a very clear definition, given that thinking about a table appears to be a 'thing grasped in thought'. Presumably it refers to things which can only be grasped in thought, which seems to make it entirely a priori. |
| 9217 | Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman] |
| Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices. | |
| From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003]) | |
| A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there. |