Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Laughter' and 'Twilight of the Idols'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
     Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61
     A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy.
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Ages are to be assessed by their positive forces - and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last great age.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.37)
     A reaction: I suspect that Nietzsche places art very high among the positive forces. Science and technology showed barely a glimmer during the Renaissance. Mathematics moved very little, Copernicus was ignored, and logic was static.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.2)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. …Sophist culture, by which I mean realist culture, attains in him its perfect expression.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 9.2)
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.7)
     A reaction: Nice. At its deepest level thinking isn't a rational process?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason).
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1)
     A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought.
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer).
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5)
     A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account.
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7)
     A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter.
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9)
     A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 26)