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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)' and 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Abstract identity (which is what here is also called 'concept') and being are the two moments that reason seeks to unify; this unification is the Ideal of reason.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §49)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I connect it to Aristotle's approach to the problem of being, which was to abandon the head-on approach, and aim to understand the identities of particulars and kinds.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
     Full Idea: The older metaphysics has the naïve presupposition that thinking grasps what things are in-themselves, that things only are what they genuinely are when they are captured in thought.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §28 Add)
     A reaction: His 'older' metaphysics is prior to Kant's critique. The less naïve version is more aware of antinomies and dialectical conflicts within thought.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §24), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 02 'Logic'
     A reaction: Not a very clear definition, given that thinking about a table appears to be a 'thing grasped in thought'. Presumably it refers to things which can only be grasped in thought, which seems to make it entirely a priori.