display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
| 21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| Full Idea: The alleged paradox of analysis asserts that if one knew what was involved in the concept, one would not need the analysis; if one did not know what was involved in the concept, no analysis could be forthcoming. | |
| From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1) | |
| A reaction: This is the sort of problem that seemed to bug Plato a lot. You certainly can't analyse something if you don't understand it, but it seems obvious that you can illuminatingly analyse something of which you have a reasonable understanding. |