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Ideas for 'Writing the Book of the World', 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' and 'Notebooks'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert]
     Full Idea: To seek wisdom rather than truth. It is more within our grasp.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797)
     A reaction: A nice challenge to the traditional goal of philosophy. The idea that we should 'seek truth' only seems to have emerged during the Reformation. The Greeks may well never have dreamed of such a thing.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert]
     Full Idea: Everything we think must be thought with our entire being, body and soul.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1798)
     A reaction: Not just that thinking must be a whole-hearted activity, but that the very contents of our thinking will be better if it arises out of being a physical creature, and not just a disembodied reasoner. Maybe the bowels are not needed to analyse set theory.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
     Full Idea: What stops or holds us back in metaphysics is a love of certainty.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1814)
     A reaction: This is a prominent truth from the age of Descartes, but may have diminished in the twenty-first century. The very best metaphysicians (e.g. Aristotle and Lewis) always end in a trail of dots when things become unsure.
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
     Full Idea: Ontological 'cheaters' are those ne'er-do-well metaphysicians (such as presentists, phenomenalists, or solipsists) who refuse to countenance a sufficiently robust conception of the fundamental to underwrite the truths they accept.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4)
     A reaction: Presentists are placed in rather insalubrious company here, The notion of 'cheaters' is nice, and I associate it with Australian philosophy, and the reason that was admired by David Lewis.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is. Structure.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01)
     A reaction: The opening words of his book. I take them to be absolutely correct, and to articulate the new orthodoxy about metaphysics which has emerged since about 1995. He expands this as being about patterns, categories and joints.
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
     Full Idea: The most extreme critics of metaphysics base their critique on sweeping views about language (logical positivism), or knowledge (empiricism), ...but this notoriously threatens the science of unobservables as much as it threatens metaphysics.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 05.1)
     A reaction: These criticisms also threaten speculative physics (even about what is possibly observable).
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
     Full Idea: It has always seemed odd that insight into the fundamental workings of the universe should be gained by reflection on how we think and speak.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 07.8)
     A reaction: A nice expression of what should by now be obvious to all philosophers - that analysis of language is not going to reveal very much. It is merely clearing the undergrowth so that we can go somewhere.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
     Full Idea: Conceptual analysts generally regard intuitive judgements about particular cases as being far more diagnostic than intuitive judgements about general principles.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.4 n7)
     A reaction: Since I take the aim to be the building up an accurate picture about general truths, it would be daft to just leap to our intuitions about those general truths. Equally you can't cut intuition out of the picture (pace Ladyman).