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Ideas for 'The Rationality of Science', 'Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II)' and 'fragments/reports'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
22077 Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics means nothing other than the range of general determinations of thought, the diamond lattice, as it were, into which we bring all material and thereby first make it intelligible.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II) [1817], §3), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - Hegel p.95
     A reaction: This sounds to me like a perfect summary of Kant's transcendental view. Metaphysics is the a priori deconstruction of our conceptual scheme. But for Kant it is fixed, and for Hegel it is dynamic.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2)
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3)
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)