display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For some people metaphysics is a general theory of objects (ontology) - a discipline which is to be developed in a purely empirical way, and which differs from other empirical disciplines in its generality. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 19) | |
A reaction: Tarski says some people despise it, but for him such metaphysics is 'not objectionable'. I subscribe to this view, but the empirical aspect is very remote, because it's too general for detail observation or experiment. Generality is the key to philosophy. |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Disputes like the vague one about 'the right conception of truth' occur in all domains where, instead of exact, scientific terminology, common language with its vagueness and ambiguity is used; and they are always meaningless, and therefore in vain. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 14) | |
A reaction: Taski taught a large number of famous philosophers in California in the 1950s, and this approach has had a huge influence. Recently there has been a bit of a rebellion. E.g. Kit Fine doesn't think it can all be done in formal languages. |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Once we move beyond investigating correlations between observables the question of what does or should guide our choice between alternative explanatory accounts becomes problematic. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], IX.2) |
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], II.3) |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: We are only justified in regarding scientific practice as the very paradigm of rationality if we can justify the claim that scientific change is rationally explicable. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.2) |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation. | |
From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4) |