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3 ideas
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It may be that the necessary/contingent distinction is tied to a metaphysics which recognises possibility as a real something wider than actuality. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong responds by trying to give an account of possibility in terms of 'combinations' from actuality. I think powers offer a much better strategy. |
| 15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: Three main theories of the truth of indicative conditionals are Materialism (the conditions are the same as for the material conditional), Idealism (identifying assertability with truth-value), and Nihilism (no truth, just assertability). | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.3) |
| 15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
| Full Idea: It is contentious whether conditionals have negations, and whether 'it is not the case that if A,B' has any clear meaning. | |
| From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.9) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be connected to Lewis's proof that a probability conditional cannot be reduced to a single proposition. If a conditional only applies to A-worlds, it is not surprising that its meaning gets lost when it leaves that world. |