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2 ideas
| 13820 | The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock] |
| Full Idea: The common Rule of Necessitation says that what can be proved is necessary, but this is incorrect if we do not permit empty names. The most straightforward answer is to modify elementary logic so that only necessary truths can be proved. | |
| From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.4) |
| 15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
| Full Idea: A statement is a law of nature if it is true in all those worlds which differ only as to their initial conditions, that is in which the underlying mechanisms of nature are the same. | |
| From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 4) | |
| A reaction: Harré takes it that laws of nature have to be necessary, by definition. I like this way of expressing natural necessity, in terms of 'mechanisms' rather than of 'laws'. Where do the mechanisms get their necessity? |