display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12) | |
A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description. |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The scholastic view is that Actuality is our only guide to possibility in the real order. One knows that it is possible to separate A and B if one knows that A and B have actually been separated or are separate. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: It may be possible to separate A and B even though it has never happened, but it is hard to see how we could know that. (But if I put my pen down where it has never been before, I know I can pick it up again, even though this has not previously happened). |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19) |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19) |