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2 ideas
| 12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I can as little conceive of different varieties of myself as of a circle whose diameters are not all of equal length. These variations would all be distinct one from another, and thus one of these varieties of myself would necessarily not be me. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be, at the very least, a rejection of any idea that I could have a 'counterpart'. It is unclear, though, where he would place a version of himself who learned a new language, or who might have had, but didn't have, a haircut. |
| 11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: If the life of some person, or something went differently than it does, nothing would stop us from saying that it would be another person, or another possible universe which God had chosen. So truly it would be another individual. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.14) | |
| A reaction: Plantinga quotes this as an example of 'worldbound individuals'. This sort of remark leads to people saying that Leibniz believes all properties are essential, since they assume that his notion of essence is bound up with identity. But is it? |