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2 ideas
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
Full Idea: Three degrees necessity in logic or semantics: first and least is attaching a semantical predicate to the names of statements (as Nec '9>5'); second and more drastic attaches to statements themselves; third and gravest attaches to open sentences. | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.158) |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
Full Idea: Necessity resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about. | |
From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176) | |
A reaction: This is a culminating idea of Quine's thoroughgoing empiricism, as filtered through logical positivism. I would hardly dare to accuse Quine of a use/mention confusion (his own bête noir), but one seems to me to be lurking here. |