display all the ideas for this combination of texts
10 ideas
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Necessity is what makes it impossible for something to be other than it is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b03) | |
| A reaction: Note that necessity here seems like an active force, rather than a mere description of a logical or metaphysical state of affairs. The underlying idea seems to be that essences enforce necessities, but it doesn't say that here. |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If anything has the property of being perishable it has it of necessity, on pain of one and the same thing being perishable and imperishable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1059a05) | |
| A reaction: Of course the perishable could become imperishable over time, without contradiction. This illustrates the foundational idea that a proposition is necessary if its negation is a contradiction. [...actually this argument is invalid as it stands!] |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The potential occurs when it is not necessary that its contrary be false. For example, it is potential that a man should be seated, since it is not false of necessity that he is not seated. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019b26) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard point in modal logic that possibly is equivalent to not-necessarily-not (◊p → ¬□¬p). |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If what we have stated either is the possible or something connected to it, there can of course be no question of its being true to say that x is capable of being but will not be. ...What is not but is capable of being either is or comes into being. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047b05) | |
| A reaction: I'm a bit startled to find the great Aristotle spouting this nonsense. It's possible that every bird in England could simultaneously land in my home town, but it ain't never going to happen. Modern women could bear 50 children, but won't. |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The possession of a potentiality just is the possession of a potentiality to act, and such a potentiality is not unconditional but depends on the obtaining of propitious circumstances, which includes the satisfaction of a ceteris paribus condition. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a18) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be pretty exactly what we mean by a 'power', as something which requires no other driving force, but which only expresses itself with the endless complexity of the rest of nature. |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from the actuality that the potentiality is recognised. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051a29) | |
| A reaction: I presume it is from this simple fact that Sider and others draw the mistaken inference that there are no potentialities in the actual world. |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is a principle of change or process is said to be a 'potentiality' [dunamis], whether in something else or in the thing itself qua something else. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a18) |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things are broken, compressed, bent and, in a word, destroyed not by dint of having a potentiality but by dint of not having one and by missing out on something. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a27) | |
| A reaction: Presumably an ontology entirely based on powers would not also need to catalogue absence of powers. The positive ones do the job. No power, no destruction. |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For some things, the cause of their necessity is something other than themselves, whereas for others there is no such external cause, but rather they are themselves the necessary cause of other things being the case. The simple is fundamentally necessary. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b14) | |
| A reaction: What is 'simple' is what terminates an explanation, and that is what-it-is-to-be each thing (its essence). The Greek view of necessity always seems to be a power to which we submit, rather than a passive state like true-in-all-worlds. |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle conceives of the necessary truths as being distinct and derivative from the essential truths. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Kathrin Koslicki - Essence, Necessity and Explanation 13.1 | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the view promoted by Kit Fine in 1994. It seems to fragment necessity, because there are many different necessities based on many different foundations. |