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3 ideas
12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
Full Idea: In order that it be valid to infer q from p, it is only necessary that p should be true and that the proposition 'not-p or q' should be true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt points out that this approach to logical consequences is a denial of any modal aspect, such as 'logical necessity'. Russell observes that for a good inference you must know the disjunction as a whole. Could disjunction be modal?... |
14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no need to admit as a fundamental notion any form of implication not expressible as a truth-function. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
A reaction: Note that this is from a book about 'mathematical' philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems to have the form of a universal credo for Russell. He wasn't talking about conditionals here. Maybe conditionals are not implications (in isolation, that is). |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
Full Idea: Saying that the axiom of reducibility is logically necessary is what would be meant by saying that it is true in all possible worlds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
A reaction: This striking remark is a nice bridge between Leibniz (about whom Russell wrote a book) and Kripke. |