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3 ideas
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
Full Idea: Talk of possible worlds is a graphic way of waging the essentialist philosophy, but it is only that; it is not an explication. Essence is needed to identify an object from one possible world to another. | |
From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.118) | |
A reaction: He makes the proposal sound circular, but I take a commitment to essences to be prior to talk of possible worlds. Possible worlds are a tool for clarifying modalities, not for clarifying essential identities. |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
Full Idea: A rigid designator differs from others in that it picks out its object by essential traits. It designates the object in all possible worlds in which it exists. | |
From: Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.118) | |
A reaction: This states the point more clearly than Kripke ever does, and I presume it is right. Thus when we say that we wish 'our' Hubert Humphrey had won the election, we can allow that his victory elation would change him a bit. Kripke is right. |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Consideration of our ability to count objects across possibilities strongly favour both the Barcan formula and its converse. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I can understand counting objects across possibilities. The objects themselves are possibilia, and possibilia seem to include unknowns. The unexpected is highly possible. |