Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld', 'Essence and Modality' and 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong'

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6 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

11166	The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: We naturally suppose, if a subject-predicate proposition is necessary, that the subject of the proposition is the source of the necessity. But that singleton 2 contains 2 is necessary, whether the number or the set is the subject of the proposition.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9)
	A reaction: A very nice addition to his general attack on the idea that essence should be accounted for in terms of his necessity. He asks a beautifully simple question: for each necessity that we accept, what is the source of that necessity?

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

11169	Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Conceptual (and logical) necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts (or just the logical concepts).
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9-10)
	A reaction: The idea that something might be true simply because of the nature of a concept sounds good, and a slightly better formulation than traditional accounts of analytic truth.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence

11162	Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It is necessary that Socrates and the Eiffel Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower, for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5)
	A reaction: I find this simple argument very persuasive in separating out necessary facts about an object from the essence of that object.

11168	Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The metaphysically necessary truths can be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9)
	A reaction: This is part of Fine's proposal that necessities are derived from the essences or natures of things, which view I find very congenial.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity

12904	If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I can as little conceive of different varieties of myself as of a circle whose diameters are not all of equal length. These variations would all be distinct one from another, and thus one of these varieties of myself would necessarily not be me.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13)
	A reaction: This seems to be, at the very least, a rejection of any idea that I could have a 'counterpart'. It is unclear, though, where he would place a version of himself who learned a new language, or who might have had, but didn't have, a haircut.

11981	If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: If the life of some person, or something went differently than it does, nothing would stop us from saying that it would be another person, or another possible universe which God had chosen. So truly it would be another individual.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.14)
	A reaction: Plantinga quotes this as an example of 'worldbound individuals'. This sort of remark leads to people saying that Leibniz believes all properties are essential, since they assume that his notion of essence is bound up with identity. But is it?