display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Chance is the name for some law that is unknown to us? If you say 'each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws', it seems to me it is not these laws which made the tie turn up sixes, for the laws act the same when other throws come up. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.333) |
| 14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
| A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |