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2 ideas
12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity. | |
From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1 | |
A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity. |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: A thing is shown to be impossible when a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition. | |
From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.214) | |
A reaction: The problem is always that imagination is needed to see the 'repugnancy', and that is relative and limited. |