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2 ideas
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If a conditional remains truth-functional it is incapable of expressing the fact that the connection between antecedent and consequent in the conditional is a causal one rather than merely accidental | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 03.8) | |
A reaction: This is the first step towards an account of conditionals which will work in real life rather than merely in classical logic. |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7) | |
A reaction: [he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out. |