Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic' and 'Causality and Properties'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: In relevant logic, the necessary truths are not those which are true in every situation; rather, they are those for which it is necessary that there is a situation making them true.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2)
     A reaction: This seems to rest on the truthmaker view of such things, which I find quite attractive (despite Merricks's assault). Always ask what is making some truth necessary. This leads you to essences.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: The ways in which a given thing can be different in different possible worlds depend on the ways in which such a thing can be different at different times in the actual world.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05)
     A reaction: Where change in a thing is possible across time in the actual world seems to require a combination of experiment and imagination. Unimaginability does not entail necessity, but it may be the best guide we have got.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: We could use 'conceivable' to say it is not provable that it is not the case, or we could use it to say that it is compatible with what we know.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10)
     A reaction: Rather significant, since the first one would seem to allow in a great deal that the second one would rule out. Any disproof of some natural possibility founders on the remark that 'you never know'.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: It is possible to conceive what is not possible.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10)
     A reaction: The point here is that, while we cannot clearly conceive the impossible in a world like mathematics, we can conceive of impossible perceptions in the physical world, such as a bonfire burning under water.