display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity is just as strong as logical necessity in that the space of metaphysical possibility is exactly the same as the space of logical possibility: the logically possible worlds = the metaphysically possible worlds. | |
From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.1) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. To be the 'same strength' there would also have to be the same number of logical as metaphysical truths, and I presume that is not the case. There are far more logical than metaphysical possibilities. |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology. | |
From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02 | |
A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'. |