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2 ideas
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
Full Idea: Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation. | |
From: Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 5.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting view. We might stipulate that any possible Aristotle is 'our Aristotle', but you would still need criteria for deciding which possible Aristotle's would qualify. Long-frozen Aristotles, stupid Aristotles, alien Aristotle's, deformed... |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The existence of someone in another world who is a lot like me, but happier, is irrelevant to whether I - this very person - could have been happier, even if we call that other-worldly someone 'my counterpart'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV) | |
A reaction: He says this is a familiar objection. I retain a lingering deterministic doubt about whether it ever makes to sense to say that I 'could' have been happy, given that I am not. It does seem to make sense to say that I was close to happiness, but missed it. |