Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception' and 'Material Beings'

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5 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12)
     A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)