13084
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How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It is yet unknown to me what is the reason of the incompossibility of things, or how it is that different essences can be opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G VII:194), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.4.4
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A reaction:
Since 'heavy' seems straightforwardly opposed to 'light', we would have to ask what he means by 'positive'. The suspicion is that all things are compossible by definition, so it is not surprising that impossibilities are a bit puzzling.
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15883
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Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
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Full Idea:
Leibniz sets up increasingly stringent conditions possible worlds must meet. The weakest is non-contradiction, for truths of reason; then sufficient reason, for rational worlds; then identity of indiscernibles, for duplicates; then compossibility.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 4
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A reaction:
[my summary of a very nice two pages by Harré] God is the source of the principles which do the narrowing down.
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7837
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Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
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Full Idea:
In his early writings the principle of sufficient reason made it difficult for Leibniz to conceive of possible things;...raising this to possible worlds means God does not choose things that are evil, but chooses a world which must have evil in it.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.14
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A reaction:
Where we think of possible worlds as explanations for conditional and counterfactual truths (I take it), Leibniz developed the original idea as part of his huge effort to achieve a consistent theodicy.
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13080
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Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
When Leibniz has the grounds of de re counterfactuals in mind, a counterpart picture, we have argued, is at work.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.2.2
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A reaction:
If Leibniz were a 'superessentialist', then individuals would be totally worldbound (because their relations would be essential). Cover/Hawthorne argue that he is just a 'strong' essentialist, allowing possible counterparts. Quite persuasive.
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