display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Total ways things cannot be are also 'worlds', or maximal ways for things to be. They are impossible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: This unorthodox view doesn't sound too plausible to me. To think of a circular square as a 'way things could be' sounds pretty empty, and mere playing with words. The number 7 could be the Emperor of China? |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!) |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: If one ignores impossible worlds, then ways things might have been are the only ways for things to be that are left. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: Impossible worlds are included in 'ways for things to be', but excluded from 'ways things might have been'. I struggle with a circle being square as a 'way for circles to be'. I suppose being the greatest philosopher is a way for me to be. |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means. |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or ¬p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on. |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: I conceive of possible worlds as certain sorts of maximal abstract entities according to which certain things (facts, states of affairs) obtain and certain other things do not obtain. They are total ways things might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3) | |
A reaction: Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'. |