Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics' and 'Essence and Modality'

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5 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

11166	The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: We naturally suppose, if a subject-predicate proposition is necessary, that the subject of the proposition is the source of the necessity. But that singleton 2 contains 2 is necessary, whether the number or the set is the subject of the proposition.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9)
	A reaction: A very nice addition to his general attack on the idea that essence should be accounted for in terms of his necessity. He asks a beautifully simple question: for each necessity that we accept, what is the source of that necessity?

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

11169	Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Conceptual (and logical) necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts (or just the logical concepts).
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9-10)
	A reaction: The idea that something might be true simply because of the nature of a concept sounds good, and a slightly better formulation than traditional accounts of analytic truth.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence

11162	Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It is necessary that Socrates and the Eiffel Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower, for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5)
	A reaction: I find this simple argument very persuasive in separating out necessary facts about an object from the essence of that object.

11168	Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The metaphysically necessary truths can be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever.
	From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9)
	A reaction: This is part of Fine's proposal that necessities are derived from the essences or natures of things, which view I find very congenial.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

16188	Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
	Full Idea: Serious Actualism is the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it of any kind, including its very non-existence
	From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1 n4)
	A reaction: He suggests that the Converse Barcan Formula implies this view. It sounds comparable to the view of Presentism about time, that no future or past truthmakers exist right now. If a new square table were to exist, it would have four corners.