Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Material Beings', 'works' and 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding'

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6 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
2216 We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
     Full Idea: Where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in the same proportion in transferring the past to the future.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VI.47)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
2215 There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as chance in the world.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VI.46)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12)
     A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)