Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Material Beings', 'Logic in Mathematics' and 'Epistemic Norms'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

5 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
     Full Idea: True statements about the necessary properties of things need not be necessarily true. The well-known example is that the number of planets (9) is necessarily an odd number. The necessity is de re, but not de dicto.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Nat.Internal')
     A reaction: This would be a matter of the scope (the placing of the brackets) of the 'necessarily' operator in a formula. The quick course in modal logic should eradicate errors of this kind in your budding philosopher.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12)
     A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)