Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Material Beings', 'Universal Prescriptivism' and 'Practical Necessity'

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5 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
23283 Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Any notion of necessity must carry with it a corresponding notion of impossibility, …but it can make a difference which one of them presents itself first and more naturally.
     From: Bernard Williams (Practical Necessity [1982], p.127)
     A reaction: I like this because it connects modality with experience, rather than with formal logic. It seems right that in life we immediately see either a necessity or an impossibility, and inferring the other case is an afterthought.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12)
     A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: The notion of a merely possible object is an even more defective notion than the notion of a borderline object; after all, a merely possible object is an object that definitely isn't there.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)