display all the ideas for this combination of texts
9 ideas
| 11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
| Full Idea: The equation of 'necessity' with 'true in every possible world' is known as the S5 conception, corresponding to the strongest of C.I.Lewis's five modal systems. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Are the worlds naturally, or metaphysically, or logically possible? |
| 10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
| Full Idea: The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: [He attributes this idea to Frank Jackson] This makes the point, against Grice, that the implication of conditionals is not conversational but a matter of logical convention. See Idea 21396 for a very different view. |
| 10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
| Full Idea: The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional, that is, that their truth-values are determined by the truth-values of their constituents. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.3) |
| 11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
| Full Idea: Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 14283, where this appears to have been 'proved' by Lewis, and is not just a view held by some people. |
| 10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
| Full Idea: The modal Platonist denies that knowledge always depends on a causal relation. The reality of possible worlds is an ontological requirement, to secure the truth-values of modal propositions. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: [Reply to Idea 10982] This seems to be a case of deriving your metaphyics from your semantics, of which David Lewis seems to be guilty, and which strikes me as misguided. |
| 10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
| Full Idea: If modal Platonism was true, how could we ever know the truth of a modal proposition? | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be very important. Our knowledge of modal truths must depend on our knowledge of the actual world. The best answer seems to involve reference to the 'powers' of the actual world. A reply is in Idea 10983. |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| Full Idea: There are two main forms of actualism: reductionism, which seeks to construct possible worlds out of some more mundane material; and moderate realism, in which the actual concrete world is contrasted with abstract, but none the less real, possible worlds. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I am a reductionist, as I do not take abstractions to be 'real' (precisely because they have been 'abstracted' from the things that are real). I think I will call myself a 'scientific modalist' - we build worlds from possibilities, discovered by science. |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| Full Idea: A possible world is a complete determination of the truth-values of all propositions over a certain domain. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Even if the domain is very small? Even if the world fitted the logic nicely, but was naturally impossible? |
| 11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
| Full Idea: If each possible world constitutes a concrete reality, then no object can be present in more than one world - objects may have 'counterparts', but cannot be identical with them. | |
| From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This explains clearly why in Lewis's modal realist scheme he needs counterparts instead of rigid designation. Sounds like a slippery slope. If you say 'Humphrey might have won the election', who are you talking about? |