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2 ideas
| 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Strictly speaking, the distinction between two brands of necessity is one of grounds, rather than modality. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.06) | |
| A reaction: This idea I associate with Kit Fine. I like it, because it allows 'necessity' to be a univocal concept, which seems right to me. The types of necessity arise from types of things which already occur in our ontology. |
| 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: There are necessities grounded in the individual real essences of things, and necessities grounded in the natural kind essences of things. In the first case, without the property it isn't that individual, and in the second it isn't a member of that kind. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the distinction we must hang onto to avoid a huge amount of confusion in this territory. I just say that ceasing to be that individual will presumably entail ceasing to be that kind, but not necessarily vice versa, so individual essences rule. |