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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Priori Knowledge' and 'Nature's Metaphysics'

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6 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
     Full Idea: It does not add to the kinds of necessity to say that p is 'nomologically necessary' iff (the laws of nature → p) is metaphysically necessary. That trick of construction could be pulled for 'feline necessity' (true in all worlds that contain cats).
     From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2)
     A reaction: I love it! Bird seems to think that the only necessity is 'metaphysical' necessity, true in all possible worlds, and he is right. The question arises in modal logic, though, of the accessibility between worlds (which might give degrees of necessity?).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
     Full Idea: I do not regard logical necessitation as a kind of necessity. It is logically possible that George Orwell is not Eric Blair, but in what sense is this any kind of possibility? It arises from having two names, but that confers no genuine possibility.
     From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.1.2)
     A reaction: How refreshing. All kinds of concepts like this are just accepted by philosophers as obvious, until someone challenges them. The whole undergrowth of modal thinking needs a good flamethrower taken to it.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
20475 Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
     Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
20476 If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
     Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
     Full Idea: Whereas the link between imaginability and possibility was once held, under the influence of empiricism, to be close, it is now widely held to be very remote.
     From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 8)
     A reaction: Tim Williamson nicely argues the opposite - that assessment of possibility is an adjunct of our ability to think counterfactually, which is precisely an operation of the imagination. Big error is possible, but how else could we do it?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
     Full Idea: The core of haecceitism is the view that the transworld identity of particulars does not supervene on their qualitative features. ...The simplest expression of it is that particulars lack essential properties.
     From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be something the 'bare substratum' account of substance (associated with Locke). You are left with the difficulty of how to individuate an instance of the haecceity, as opposed to the bundle of properties attached to it.