Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' and 'Explanatory Coherence'

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3 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
15079 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I can accept 'conceptual' necessity, as long as it is only identified with 'narrow' logical necessity. For I take it that the 'conceptually' necessary is that which is true solely in virtue of concepts together with the laws of logic.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4)
     A reaction: In the narrow version of logical necessity (Idea 8260) some definitions are required in addition to the mere laws of logic. This implies that the concepts are dependent of definitions, which is a bit restrictive. Aren't we allowed undefined concepts?
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Lowe (1998) defines metaphysical necessity in terms of logical necessity 'broadly contrued'.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM - The Impossibility of Superdupervenience n 3
     A reaction: [I seem to have missed this simple thought in Lowe 1998 - must revisit]. Both metaphysical and logical necessity can be taken as 'true in all possible worlds', but that doesn't make them the same truths.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
8260 Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Strict' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic alone; 'narrow' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic plus definitions of non-logical terms; 'broad' logical necessity is true in every possible world where the laws of logic hold.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4)
     A reaction: Lowe then says the third is close to 'metaphysical' necessity. I am unable to distinguish the third from the first. You can't claim that a logical implication holds in this world, but not in another possible world which has the same rules of implication.