16984
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I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
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A reaction:
I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.
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9385
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The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property).
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14)
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A reaction:
If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it.
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4899
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Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Using possible worlds to model truth-conditions of statements has led to considerable clarity about the logic of modality. Attempts to use the system for epistemic purposes, however, have been plagued by problems.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
Presumably what lurks behind this is a distinction between what is logically or naturally possible, and what appears to be possible from the perspective of a conscious mind. Is there a possible world in which I can fly?
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4898
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Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Possible worlds can be thought of as indices for models of the language in question, or as concrete realities (David Lewis), or as abstract ways the world might be (Robert Stalnaker), or in various other ways.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
I strongly favour the Stalnaker route here. Reducing great metaphysics to mere language I find abhorrent, and I suspect that Lewis was trapped by his commitment to strong empiricism. We must embrace abstractions into our ontology.
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16983
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Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities.
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16)
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A reaction:
Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices.
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