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2 ideas
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: If possible worlds are sets of propositions, we need some way to distinguish those sets of propositions that do from those that do not correspond to genuine possibilities. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The idea of a 'genuine' possibility does not seem to play a role in the conceptual scheme of those who treat possibility entirely in terms of possible worlds. If possibility is primitive, or is a set of worlds, there can be no criterion for 'genuine'. |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Is it not possible that there be objects with (natural) properties that no actual thing ever had the potentiality to have, to produce, or constitute? (Call such properties 'super-alien properties'). | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for her potentiality account of possibility. Her solution is (roughly) to either deny the super-aliens, or have chains of iterated possibility which take this case back to actuality. That sounds OK to me. |