display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
Full Idea: We must conclude that priority is a modality distinct from that of time or necessity, a modality arising in some way out of the manner in which a collection is constituted from its members. | |
From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.3) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the 'iterative' view of sets, and cites Aristotle 'Metaphysics' 1019a1-4 as background. |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spirit of Humeanism is that necessity is not a realm to be discovered. We draw the lines around what is necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I disagree, but it is hard to argue the point. My intuitions are that the obvious necessities of logic and mathematics reflect the way nature has to be. The deepest necessities are patterns (about which God has no choice). |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
Full Idea: English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7) | |
A reaction: Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid. |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
Full Idea: If □φ says that φ is true by convention, then □φ would apparently turn out to be contingent, since statements about what conventions we adopt are not themselves true by convention. The main axioms of S4 and S5 would be false. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
Full Idea: Conventionalism is apparently inapplicable to Kripke's and Putnam's examples of the necessary a posteriori (and, relatedly, to de re modality). | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [Sidelle 1989 discusses this] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11) | |
A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities. |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12) | |
A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active. |