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19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance, as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a distribution. ...In order to have any meaning, it must refer to some definite arrangement of all the things. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VI) |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
Full Idea: Stalnaker proposes that a conditional is true if its consequent is true in the minimal revision in which the antecedent is true, that is, in the most similar possible world in which the antecedent is true. | |
From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (works [1970]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A similar account of counterfactuals was taken up by Lewis to give a (rather dubious) account of causation. |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: In our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be true. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Peirce is discussing Diodorus, and proposes the view nowadays defended by Edgington, though in the end Peirce defends the standard material conditional as simpler. I suspect that this discussion by Peirce is not well known. |