Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'The Passions of the Soul'
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10 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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9205
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The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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9209
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Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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9200
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Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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11984
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Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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11980
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A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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11982
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If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
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11983
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It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
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11985
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If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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11986
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The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
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11987
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Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
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