Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'Reference and Necessity'
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16 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14528
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Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12611
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Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
17852
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A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15779
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Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
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15769
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Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
14544
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Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
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15774
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We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
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15777
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A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
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15778
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Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
12612
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Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
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15108
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Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397
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If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
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16399
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Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
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16398
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Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396
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Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408
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Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
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