Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Apriority and Existence' and 'Getting Causes from Powers'
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15 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14579
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Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
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14580
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Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12611
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Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
17852
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A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14552
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Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15769
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Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
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14578
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Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
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15779
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Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
15777
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A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
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14544
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Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
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15774
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We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
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15778
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Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14549
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Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
12612
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Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
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15108
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Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
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