Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Intensions Revisited'
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19 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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12611
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Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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17852
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A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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8483
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Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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15769
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Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
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15779
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Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
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15777
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A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
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15778
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Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
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14544
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Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
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15774
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We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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6882
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Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
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6886
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Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
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6885
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Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
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6884
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Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
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6883
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Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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12612
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Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
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15108
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Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
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5449
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Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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13589
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Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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13588
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A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
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