Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'
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7 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
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Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
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It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
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A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
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X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
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Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
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