Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Correspondence Theory of Truth', 'In Praed.' and 'Mere Possibilities'
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9 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16466
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Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438
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Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436
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Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16433
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Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16437
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Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
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16444
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Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
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16445
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I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16454
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Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16450
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Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
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