Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'
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13 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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15079
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'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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16063
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Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
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18849
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Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
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18850
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'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
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18858
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Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
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18857
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Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
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18856
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Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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8260
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Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
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18848
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Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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16131
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The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
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18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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18853
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A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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8320
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Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
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